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TEAR GAS + WATER HOSES + DISPERSAL ORDERS: 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ENDORSES BRUTALITY 
IN PROTEST POLICING 
KAREN J. PITA LOOR 
ABSTRACT 
Thirty years ago, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court determined that 
excessive-force claims against police should proceed via the Fourth 
Amendment, which theoretically protects an individual against unreasonable 
siezures. However, the Court showed extreme deference to law enforcement’s 
use of force by using a permissive reasonableness analysis that bestows on 
police great leeway to make quick split-second decisions in tense and rapidly 
evolving circumstances. The result is a test that, from its inception, has been too 
forgiving of police violence and misconduct. This lax reasonableness standard, 
along with qualified immunity principles, has shielded police from § 1983 civil 
rights litigation in excessive-force cases. However, the obstacles to relief are 
worse when the victim is not an individual in a regular street encounter but 
rather an activist during a protest—particularly an activist of color. 
This Essay explores this phenomenon through the lens of the Dundon v. 
Kirchmeier litigation that stemmed from the 2016 police assault on indigenous 
protestors opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline. The encounter left 200 activists 
injured after law enforcement blasted them overnight with tear gas, special 
impact munitions, and fire hoses to remove them from the area. In refusing to 
enjoin the police’s use of these weapons against water protectors, the judge 
questioned whether the Fourth Amendment even protected activists since police 
sought to disperse them, instead of arrest them. The judge then reasoned that 
even if the Fourth Amendment applied, the police use of force was reasonable 
considering the volatility of the crowd despite information that the plaintiffs 
themselves were peaceful—thus attributing the conduct of the entire group to 
the plaintiffs and erroneously amplifying the threat to law enforcement. Both 
lines of reasoning threaten the safety of protestors. The first removes from 
Fourth Amendment protection the emblematic protest scenario where police use 
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force to disperse protestors. The second turns the Constitution on its head, 
foregoing traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which inquires whether the 
government intrusion is reasonable in light of the individual’s actions, not the 
actions of the whole group in proximity to the individual. This is most dangerous 
to activists of color who are most likely to be perceived as threatening by police 
and to be the subject of their ire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 20, 2016, members of the Oceti Šakowiŋ tribe and others stood 
on top of the Backwater Bridge together in prayer and protest in opposition to 
the construction of a 1172-mile-long pipeline that would transfer fuel from 
North Dakota to Illinois.1 The water protectors2 opposed the pipeline for both 
spiritual and environmental reasons.3 They were unarmed.4 Still, police 
descended upon the activists like a military unit—aboard armored vehicles and 
fully loaded with special impact munitions,5 tear gas, water cannons, and fire 
hoses—to clear them from the area.6 In the evening and early morning, law 
enforcement blasted activists with weapons and sprayed them with water for 
several hours in freezing temperatures.7 At the conclusion of this assault, more 
than two hundred water protectors were injured,8 including twenty-six who 
required hospitalization.9 Injuries ranged from loss of vision and broken bones 
to hypothermia.10  
This aggression was not aberrational or unique to indigenous protests of the 
Dakota Access Pipeline (“DAPL”). Just in the last five years, a sampling of 
protests by activists of color outraged by police killings of black men in 
Baltimore, Baton Rouge, and Ferguson prompted similarly violent, excessive, 
 
1 First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages & Injunctive & 
Declaratory Relief at 2, 7-8, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 
2018) [hereinafter Dundon Amended Complaint]. 
2 Activists termed themselves “water protectors” instead of protesters. See Iyuskin 
American Horse, ‘We Are Protectors, Not Protesters’: Why I’m Fighting the North Dakota 
Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016, 11:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/aug/18/north-dakota-pipeline-activists-bakken-oil-fields [https://perma.cc 
/5UM3-NZNV]; see also Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9. 
3 Lauren Donovan, Sioux Spirit Camp to Protest Dakota Access Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB. 
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/sioux-spirit-camp-to-
protest-dakota-access-pipeline/article_4773fba1-f3bb-599d-96a4-7d1ddf30690e.html. 
4 Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
5 See Dave Young, Definition and Explanation of Less-Lethal, POLICEONE.COM (Nov. 28, 
2004), https://www.policeone.com/corrections-training/articles/94021-Definition-and-
explanation-of-less-lethal/ [https://perma.cc/7W58-EPBE]. 
6 Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2, 14. 
7 Id. at 3, 14-15, 38. 
8 Id. at 3. One police officer also reported a minor injury. Id. at 15. 
9 Julia Carrie Wong, Dakota Access Pipeline: 300 Protesters Injured After Police Use 
Water Cannons, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/21/dakota-access-pipeline-water-cannon-police-standing-rock-protest 
[https://perma.cc/G5FE-23HD]. 
10 Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 16, 22-24, 26-28, 30 (alleging plaintiffs 
suffered head wounds, concussions, lasting pain, difficulty walking, chemical burns, and 
broken bones). 
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and militaristic law enforcement responses.11 Protests by whites are treated 
differently. For example, one may recall the restrained law enforcement 
response to white, antigovernment militiamen who seized federal lands and 
property in Nevada and Oregon.12 This disparate treatment is unfortunately in 
line with abusive and brutal policing in minority communities and with law 
enforcement officers’ predisposition to view people of color—and consequently 
activists of color—as threatening or dangerous.13 It is also nothing new. The 
American “system of free speech” has historically treated activists of color with 
hostility.14 “In the 1960s, minorities sat in, were arrested and 
convicted[,] . . . demonstrated, sang ‘We Shall Overcome,’ and were arrested 
and convicted.”15 In his last speech before his assassination, Dr. Martin Luther 
 
11 See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DOJ, AFTER-ACTION 
ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, 
MISSOURI, at xvi, 53-60 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.police 
foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/After-Action-Assessment-of-the-Police-
Response-to-the-August-2014-Demonstrations-in-Ferguson-Missouri.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/DLV7-WZPF] (assessing police response in Ferguson and identifying themes that 
“permeated all aspects of the police response”); Conor Friedersdorf, Police Face Civilian 
Protesters—Dressed for Military Combat, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/ferguson-police-face-civil-rights-protest-dressed-for-
military-combat/375962/ (describing photograph of armed police in camouflage uniforms in 
Ferguson “squaring off against a nonviolent protestor in a t-shirt and jeans with both of his 
hands raised over his head”); Maya Lau, Helping or Hurting? Police Deploy Military-Style 
Gear at Alton Sterling Protests in Baton Rouge, THE ADVOCATE (July 11, 2016, 8:50 PM), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_5b4c6f61-632a-5824-b271-
38b2e2eda7ae.html [https://perma.cc/B7UJ-6MM8]; Collier Meyerson, Protesters Against 
Police Violence Risk the Very Thing They’re Fighting, THE NATION (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/protesters-against-police-violence-risk-the-very-thing-
theyre-fighting/ (describing trauma caused by police response in Baton Rouge). 
12 See RYAN LENZ & MARK POTOK, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., WAR IN THE WEST: THE BUNDY 
RANCH STANDOFF AND THE AMERICAN RADICAL RIGHT 5, 9-11 (Heidi Beirich ed., 2014), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/war_in_
the_west_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W8B-FP8N] (describing how officers withdrew 
without engaging in violence); Jennifer Williams, The Oregon Militia Standoff, Explained, 
VOX (Jan. 26, 2016, 10:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/3/10703712/oregon-militia-
standoff [https://perma.cc/7DHX-F4SB] (describing response to militia seizure of federal 
wildlife refuge in Oregon); see also Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of 
Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 YALE L.J.F. 685, 707-08 (2018). 
13 See LESLEY J. WOOD, CRISIS AND CONTROL: THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTEST POLICING 
41-42 (2014) (“Police and intelligence agents are much more likely to label protesters from 
poor or racially marginalized communities, ideologically oriented protesters, and youthful 
protesters [as uncooperative or threatening].”). 
14 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 207, 
221 (2004). 
15 Id. at 207. 
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King Jr. recalled confronting police water hoses and dogs in Birmingham, 
Alabama:  
And we just went on before the dogs and we would look at them; and we’d 
go on before the water hoses and we would look at it, and we’d just go on 
singing “Over my head I see freedom in the air.” And then we would be 
thrown in the paddy wagons . . . .16  
The pervasive problem of violent protest policing of activists of color has the 
same root causes as generalized police violence in communities of color and 
deserves similar attention. It is a vital line of inquiry for critical race theorists. 
The right to express dissent unhampered by the fear of police retribution and 
violence, like the right to walk the streets unharmed by the government, is an 
element of equal membership in a democracy. It is not the right of a privileged 
group. However, the freedom to complain and express opposition is elusive for 
activists of color, and courts unfortunately reinforce this condition through their 
treatment of mass protests. As Dr. King noted wistfully in that same last speech, 
But somewhere I read of the freedom of assembly. Somewhere I read of 
the freedom of speech. 
Somewhere I read of the freedom of press. Somewhere I read that the 
greatness of America is the right to protest for right. And so just as I say, 
we aren’t going to let dogs or water hoses turn us around . . . . We are going 
on.17 
Nevertheless, minority protesters and their allies are still the more likely victims 
of militarized and violent protest policing. Such was the case at the Backwater 
Bridge in North Dakota.  
The confrontation on Backwater Bridge is the subject of the Dundon v. 
Kirchmeier18 class action lawsuit. In their complaint, the plaintiffs—indigenous 
water protectors—alleged that police used excessive force in contravention of 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, chilled their First Amendment 
expression, and violated their equal protection rights.19 Although the matter is 
still pending, early in the case the district judge refused to enjoin police from 
using these less-than-lethal weapons against water protectors, and the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed.20 In ruling against the injunction on the police’s use of force, 
the district judge began by querying how the Fourth Amendment may apply to 
 
16 Martin Luther King Jr., Martin Luther King’s Final Speech: ‘I’ve Been to the 
Mountaintop’—The Full Text, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013, 3:19 PM), https://abcnews.go.com 
/Politics/martin-luther-kings-final-speech-ive-mountaintop-full/story?id=18872817 
[https://perma.cc/4ZB4-LEVU]. 
17 Id. 
18 Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
19 See id. at 38-39. 
20 Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *20 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam). 
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police action.21 This is because thirty years ago, in Graham v. Connor,22 the 
Supreme Court determined that excessive-force claims should proceed via the 
Fourth Amendment.23 This ruling has led to the evisceration of the 
overwhelming majority of excessive-force claims in one-on-one civilian-police 
encounters and to the evaluation of police brutality through a too-narrow and 
individualistic lens.24 The district judge’s treatment of the Fourth Amendment 
in Dundon led him to conclude that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on 
the merits.25 
The Dundon case demonstrates how claims of excessive police force during 
protests are even more challenging for plaintiffs than when asserted during 
regular street interactions between police and civilians. Part I of this Essay 
describes the Graham case and the manner in which the cabining of excessive-
force analysis within the Fourth Amendment, together with qualified immunity 
doctrine, acts as a nearly impenetrable bar to § 1983 litigation against police 
officers generally. Part II demonstrates that, just like police are more likely to 
violently target people of color in street encounters, law enforcement is more 
likely to confront activists of color violently. Thus, the rights and safety of 
people of color are particularly at risk during protests. Part III uses the district 
court opinion denying an injunction in Dundon to show how Graham interacts 
with other Fourth Amendment doctrine to make matters worse for individuals 
seeking relief from police-excessive-force cases in the emblematic protest 
scenario where force is used to disperse activists rather than to detain them. 
 
21 Id. at *18-19. 
22 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
23 Id. at 388 (holding that excessive-force claims are “properly analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due 
process standard”). 
24 See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. 
REV. 211, 216 (2017) (“[I]ll-considered statements in Graham and other decisions reinforce 
a ‘split-second’ theory of policing that sets the wrong constitutional floor.”); Osagie K. 
Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police 
Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor, 112 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (2018) (“The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted post-Graham, simply 
operates at the wrong level; its individualist nature cannot address a fundamentally structural 
problem.”). 
25 Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *19 (finding that no reasonable juror could conclude 
that force used by police at Backwater Bridge was “objectively unreasonable”). Chief Judge 
Hovland further denied the injunction based on the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, 
stating that the police conduct did not “shock[] the conscience.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Spain, 
209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000)). The judge also ruled that the plaintiffs were trespassing 
on property closed to the public and therefore had no right to engage in First Amendment 
activity. Id. at *20. In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs later highlighted that they were 
situated in a location open to the public. Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 12. 
The judge further ruled that any equal protection claim was dependent on the outcome of the 
excessive-force and First Amendment claims. Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *16. 
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I. GRAHAM AND LIMITS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
ON POLICE-EXCESSIVE-FORCE CASES 
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor considered 
the manner in which excessive-force claims against police should proceed.26 
Before Graham, lower courts were split as to what legal standard to apply to a 
claim of police excessive force in interactions with civilians during investigatory 
stops or arrests. The majority of courts applied Fourteenth Amendment due 
process, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the officer had subjective 
malicious intent, while other courts applied the Fourth Amendment and required 
plaintiffs to show that the officer’s conduct failed to meet the “objective 
reasonableness” standard.27  
The facts of Graham were as follows: Mr. Dethorne Graham, a black man,28 
was in the midst of a diabetic crisis and was searching for orange juice when 
police officers observed him enter and quickly leave a convenience store, get 
into his friend’s car, and drive away.29 With no additional information, Charlotte 
Police Officer M.S. Connor stopped the car and, despite explanations from both 
the driver and Mr. Graham that the latter was having a diabetic reaction, ordered 
them both to wait while he investigated what had occurred at the store.30 Mr. 
Graham then exited the car and ran around it twice. He then sat on the sidewalk 
and began talking to his friend, the driver.31 Additional police arrived in response 
to Connor’s request for backup. Ignoring the driver’s pleas for candy or juice for 
his friend, police pushed the driver aside, rolled Mr. Graham on his belly, and 
handcuffed his hands behind his back.32 At some point, Mr. Graham passed out. 
He regained consciousness after officers lifted him and placed him face down 
on the hood of the police car.33 Officers told Mr. Graham to “shut up” and pushed 
his face against the car when he asked them to look in his wallet for his diabetic 
card. The officers then threw Mr. Graham “headfirst into the police car” and 
refused to allow him to have the juice his friend brought to the car.34 Finally, the 
officers heard back that there was no incident at the store, drove Mr. Graham 
 
26 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
27 Id. at 392-93. 
28 Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (No. 87-6571), 1988 WL 1025786, 
at *3 [hereinafter Graham Petitioner Brief]. 
29 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-89. 
30 Id. at 389. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (reporting that one officer stated: “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that 
never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M. F. but drunk. Lock the S. B. up”). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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home, and released him.35 Mr. Graham sustained injuries as a result of the police 
officers’ conduct, including a permanent ringing in his ear.36  
The civil rights lawsuit proceeded to trial in the District Court for the Western 
District of North Carolina.37 Before a jury verdict, the district judge granted the 
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of excessive force, 
applying the existing test for substantive due process, which consisted of the 
following factors: 
(1) The need for the application for the force. 
(2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was 
used. 
(3) The extent of the injury inflicted. 
(4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and 
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose 
of causing harm.38  
The judge ruled that the force was “appropriate under the circumstances,” the 
victim was not injured, and the officer acted in good faith “to maintain or restore 
order in the face of a potentially explosive situation” and not “maliciously or 
sadistically.”39 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision using the 
same due process analysis.40 
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Graham argued that a Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process analysis was inappropriate and that the 
Fourth Amendment should be applied to the excessive-police-force claims.41 
Graham emphasized that the Fourth Amendment applied because he was clearly 
seized by the police officers.42 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial 
court’s decision, thereby settling the split among lower courts as to whether to 
apply the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment. Reasoning that the Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures, the Court held that where 
“the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop 
of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment.”43 The Court stated that “all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under 
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 390 (noting that, in total, Graham claimed to have sustained broken foot, cuts on 
wrists, bruises on forehead, injured shoulder, and ringing in right ear). 
37 Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986), aff’d, 827 F.2d 
945 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 396 (1989). 
38 Id. (citing King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1980)). 
39 Id. 
40 Graham, 490 U.S. at 391. 
41 Graham Petitioner Brief, supra note 28, at 8. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 396. 
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the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”44 Relevant for later 
discussion, the Graham Court defined a seizure, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,45 as 
“when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of 
authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”46 Although 
Graham advocated for the application of the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
defined “reasonableness” in a manner that was problematic for future 
plaintiffs—including Mr. Graham, who lost in his post-remand trial.47 In its 
customary display of colorblindness, the Court failed to state Mr. Graham’s race. 
In Graham, the Court defined the “calculus of reasonableness” in a manner 
that immunizes aggressive police misconduct post-Graham and provides 
excessive deference to law enforcement, who the Court bemoaned are “often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”48 The application of this version of 
reasonableness to post-Graham excessive-force cases has left civilians with no 
recourse against violent police conduct and arguably has allowed police to get 
away with murder.49  
There are two federal vehicles for either the government or individual 
plaintiffs to seek remediation for violent police misconduct. Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242, the federal government—via the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)—can 
prosecute a police officer who has violated an individual’s constitutional rights 
“on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race.”50 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the Civil Rights Act—an individual plaintiff can 
bring a civil lawsuit asserting that a police officer violated their constitutional 
rights.51 For example, § 1983 was the vehicle for the lawsuit in Graham.52 In 
view of Graham, courts have consistently cabined excessive-force analysis 
within the Fourth Amendment in both § 242 cases and § 1983 cases.  
In § 242 criminal prosecutions, despite the Graham language that the due 
process test requirement of malicious intent “is incompatible with a proper 
Fourth Amendment analysis,”53 the government must prove “evil motive” 
 
44 Id. at 395. 
45 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
46 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 
n.16). 
47 See id. at 396; Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
1182, 1207 (2017). 
48 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
49 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Editorial, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A23. 
50 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
52 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
53 Id. at 397. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction.54 Specifically, the prosecutor must 
show that the officer knew that their conduct was a violation of the victim’s 
constitutional rights and that the officer committed the act for that purpose.55 
Thus, scholars have asserted that Graham ultimately did nothing to dispel the 
intent requirement for civil rights prosecutions.56 This is evidenced in the DOJ’s 
decision not to prosecute Police Officer Darren Wilson, having concluded it 
could not show that Officer Wilson acted willfully to violate Michael Brown’s 
constitutional rights when he shot the teenager between six and eight times.57 
What’s more, even without this “evil motive” requirement, the DOJ would have 
decided not to prosecute because it concluded, citing the deferential language of 
Graham, that the “shots fired by Wilson were [not] objectively unreasonable.”58 
Although Officer Wilson claimed that he mistakenly believed that Michael 
Brown had a gun when he fired, the DOJ Report clearly states that even if Officer 
Wilson knew that Brown was walking toward him unarmed and with his hands 
up, Graham’s progeny establishes that the officer can shoot him and the officer’s 
 
54 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (“An evil motive to accomplish that 
which the statute condemns becomes a constituent element of the crime.”). 
55 See id. (interpreting statutory requirement of “willful”); see also U.S. DOJ, REPORT 
REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN 
85-86 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_ 
michael_brown_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ83-YUSA] (concluding that in Michael Brown 
shooting, DOJ did not think it would have been able to prove willfulness beyond reasonable 
doubt); Law Enforcement Misconduct, U.S. DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-
enforcement-misconduct [https://perma.cc/YNP2-KH69] (last updated Feb. 25, 2019) 
(describing necessary steps for successful prosecution under statute). 
56 See Jill I. Brown, Comment, Defining “Reasonable” Police Conduct: Graham v. 
Connor and Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1991) (“When 
courts require proof of subjective intent or significant injury, they effectively convert the 
fourth amendment inquiry into a due process test, depriving civil rights plaintiffs of Graham’s 
benefit.”). 
57 DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT, supra note 55, at 11-12, 85-86. The DOJ investigations 
into the police-involved deaths of Eric Garner and Freddie Gray reached the same conclusion 
not to prosecute. See Bobby Allyn, NYPD Officer Will Not Face Federal Criminal Charges 
in Eric Garner’s Death, NPR (July 16, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/16 
/742186042/nypd-officer-wont-face-federal-criminal-charges-in-eric-garner-s-death-
sources-s [https://perma.cc/24UU-HA2Y]; Alvin Bragg, Opinion, Eric Garner Is Proof That 
We Need to Reform Laws on Excessive Force, WASH. POST (July 17, 2019, 5:55 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/17/eric-garner-is-proof-that-we-need-
reform-laws-excessive-force/; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. DOJ, Federal 
Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-decline-prosecution-death-freddie-gray 
[https://perma.cc/5VB2-V3NU]. 
58 DOJ MICHAEL BROWN REPORT, supra note 55, at 7, 10, 85. 
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actions must be deemed reasonable and not excessive.59 Essentially, the law will 
excuse an officer’s use of deadly force in an interaction with a civilian as long 
as the individual has not already surrendered.60 This result demonstrates how 
inconsistent the Fourth Amendment analysis under § 242 is with any manner in 
which individuals assess reasonableness in regular parlance.  
Alternatively, § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is the vehicle for individual and 
class action suits for excessive police force.61 However, Graham, together with 
qualified immunity principles, has blunted the utility of § 1983 actions to 
counteract excessive police force. In addition to the Court’s lax 
“reasonableness” standard, qualified immunity allows a police officer to avoid 
liability unless they know that their action is unlawful before acting. The 
qualified immunity doctrine has developed such that police officers can avoid 
suit unless the plaintiff can point to a preceding case in which a police officer 
acted in a factually analogous manner and the court found that his conduct 
violated the Fourth Amendment.62 Otherwise, the lawsuit will be dismissed. This 
barrier from suit not only shields the police officer but also prevents the law 
from developing further. As a result, courts will rarely have to grapple with the 
question of whether a police officer’s conduct was unconstitutional. This may 
be why representatives of decedents in police-killing cases routinely sue via 
wrongful death instead of § 1983.63 The families of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, 
and Freddie Gray obtained recovery via settlement of their wrongful death 
actions.64  
 
59 Id. (finding sufficient evidence that Wilson reasonably believed that Brown posed 
deadly threat, and that use of deadly force was therefore not unreasonable). 
60 Id. at 12, 84-85 (citing Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 966 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(finding officer’s use of deadly force was not unreasonable even where victim’s arms were 
above his head and he was slowly advancing toward the officer)). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
62 See Karen J. Pita Loor, When Protest Is the Disaster: Constitutional Implications of 
State and Local Emergency Power, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2019); see also Avidan Y. 
Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1789 (2016) 
(describing how qualified immunity “stagnat[es] constitutional development”); Diana Hassel, 
Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 124-29 (2009) (discussing how courts merge 
Fourth Amendment inquiry and qualified immunity question in excessive-force cases); Tahir 
Duckett, Note, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amendment 
Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 411 (2016) (evaluating “intersection of 
the reasonableness inquiry at the center of Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, and 
the reasonable person standard of the qualified immunity defense”). 
63 See Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 
561 (1985). 
64 David Carson, Michael Brown’s Family Received $1.5 Million Settlement with 
Ferguson, NBC NEWS (June 23, 2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline 
/michael-brown-shooting/michael-brown-s-family-received-1-5-million-settlement-
ferguson-n775936 [https://perma.cc/HT26-HLPS]; Julia Marsh, City Approves $4M Payment 
to Eric Garner’s Family, N.Y. POST (Aug. 2, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/08/02 
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Despite the preceding discussion’s focus on tragic police killings of African 
Americans, it is vital to note that black men are not the only people of color who 
are the persistent victims of police violence. Latinx people likewise die at the 
hands of police at an alarming rate,65 and law enforcement kill indigenous 
peoples at a higher rate than any other group.66 Furthermore, while the most 
serious cases of police brutality lead to certain death for some civilians, for 
others—particularly people of color—violent police interactions can cause a 
dignitary “death by a thousand cuts.” Victims of these violent police encounters 
likewise find no solace in § 1983 actions and have no cause of action for 
wrongful death. Scholars have indicted Graham on various fronts: how its “split 
second” language focuses courts on the exact moment of violence and ignores 
how police could have been trained to de-escalate instead of escalate violence,67 
how it interacts with qualified immunity to shield violent and dangerous police 
misconduct from court oversight,68 and how it facilitates courts ignoring and 
overlooking the race of victims and perpetrators of police violence.69 
 
/city-approves-4m-payment-to-eric-garners-family/ [https://perma.cc/48NY-JG7C]; Yvonne 
Wenger & Mark Puente, Baltimore to Pay Freddie Gray’s Family $6.4 Million to Settle Civil 
Claims, BALT. SUN (Sept. 8, 2015, 10:01 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-
md-ci-boe-20150908-story.html. 
65 Kenya Downs, Why Aren’t More People Talking About Latinos Killed by Police?, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (July 14, 2016, 1:21 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/black-men-
werent-unarmed-people-killed-police-last-week [https://perma.cc/M22F-TTJ4] (noting that 
Latinos made up 16% of police killings in 2016). 
66 Stephanie Woodard, The Police Killings No One Is Talking About, IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 
17, 2016), https://inthesetimes.com/features/native_american_police_killings_native_lives_ 
matter.html [https://perma.cc/SC8X-EYNA]. 
67 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 62, at 1823 (arguing that generic due process right against 
excessive force could “help guard against pardoning biases . . . that may infect police 
behavior as products of ‘split-second judgments’”); Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 24, at 
223-24 (arguing that Garner reasonableness test fails to address “totality of the 
circumstances” because it does not take into account officer preparation, training, or tactics 
prior to use of force). 
68 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 62, at 1784-87; Hassel, supra note 62, at 124-29; Duckett, 
supra note 62, at 424-25. 
69 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of 
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1486, 1489 n.41, 1500 (2016) (describing racialized “broken 
windows” policing and pretextual stops that go unchecked by courts); Christian M. 
Halliburton, Race, Brain Science, and Critical Decision-Making in the Context of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 319, 332-35 (2011) (addressing 
“negative association” with people of color that lead police to assume “heightened propensity 
for violence and criminality in black men” that courts do not consider in reasonableness 
calculation); Obasogie & Newman, supra note 24, at 1470 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is an 
area of constitutional law that is structurally unsuited to address racialized group harm—an 
evaluation that is necessary for understanding the nature of police violence today.”). 
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II. ACTIVISTS OF COLOR ARE THE MORE LIKELY VICTIMS 
OF VIOLENCE IN PROTEST POLICING 
Graham, as previously discussed, excuses police violence through a 
permissive reasonableness test. As will be discussed in Part III, Graham 
coalesces with other Fourth Amendment doctrine to make matters worse for 
victims of violent and militaristic protest policing. This is of particular import to 
activists of color whose protest activities are more likely to be targets of 
excessive police attention and force. It aggregates with the high policing and 
surveillance in communities of color to create or aggravate racialized police 
violence.70 
Legal scholars have given well-deserved attention to the unequal treatment 
and targeting of people of color during regular policing.71 The manner in which 
police engage aggressively with civilians of color as they walk the streets or 
drive in their vehicles has been closely examined.72 How law enforcement 
engages with protesters of color deserves similar attention and study in the legal 
academy and among critical race scholars. Like in regular street encounters 
between police and individuals of color, the racial identity of protesters affects 
the police response.  
Certain social scientists who have examined this problem naturally have 
extrapolated from existing research demonstrating that police are more likely to 
believe that people of color carry guns73 and behave violently or criminally.74 In 
 
70 See Zach Newman, Note, “Hands up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal 
Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 151-53 (2015). 
71 See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 45-48 (1966) (discussing how implicit racial biases can lead to police 
shorthand that signals potential danger based solely on race); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, 
Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 43-48 (2009) (discussing policing and race 
as they relate to institutional housing segregation); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 208 (2007) (describing 
difficulties that arise due to police assumption that “racial minorities are more likely to be 
engaged in criminal behavior”). 
72 Bennett Capers, supra note 71, at 60-62; see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY 
FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 3-5 
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HRL-RMEC]; Carbado, supra note 69, at 1486, 1489, 1500. 
73 Anthony G. Greenwald, Mark A. Oakes & Hunter G. Hoffman, Targets of 
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses of Weapons Holders, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL., Oct. 2003, at 399, 399-405 (analyzing “signal detection theory” as method of 
evaluating racial biases in weapons holders). 
74 See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN 
COMMUNITY (1990); see also Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and 
Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 375, 380 (1997) (“[O]ne of the 
most popular negative beliefs expressed about ‘most’ blacks is that they are ‘violent and 
aggressive.’”). 
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other words, police view people of color as more threatening in day-to-day 
interactions. This research translates to how police perceive protesters of color 
versus white protesters. Just like they do during routine policing, law 
enforcement view people of color as more threatening and dangerous than 
whites during protests.75 This translates to more vigilant and aggressive policing 
of nonwhite protesters.  
A study that examined over fifteen thousand American protests during a 
thirty-year period found that during many of those years there was a “protesting 
while black” effect—although admittedly the effect was not constant during the 
entire period.76 It is important to note that study did not take into account protests 
in the last three decades. Still, the study found that African American protests 
are consistently more likely to draw police presence and vigilance than are white 
protests.77 This is unsurprising considering that protesters of color are viewed 
by police as threatening. Once police are present—in some of the years studied 
although not all—police are then more likely to make arrests and use force and 
violence against African American activists.78 This “protesting while black” 
effect was most salient in the years leading to the enactment of civil rights 
legislation.79 I will engage in some speculation and hypothesize that police—as 
state actors—engaged abusively with protesters of color prior to this legislation 
because they perceived true challenges to the status quo that they were trained 
to summarily quash. After all, police are trained to protect the existing 
hierarchical boundaries within our society.80 To the degree that police again 
perceive protests by activists of color as truly threatening current hierarchies and 
the status quo, they may again react increasingly aggressively and violently to 
these protests.  
The increasing use of militarized strategies and easy access to military tools 
and weapons multiplies the expanse and violence of police force. While 
militarized strategies are not always used, they are most likely to be used when 
law enforcement perceive protesters as dangerous.81 Militarization thus 
intersects with protesters’ racial identity. Police’s use of military vehicles, water 
 
75 See WOOD, supra note 13, at 41-42 (describing increase of SWAT teams throughout 
United States, particularly at protests); see also Christian Davenport, Sarah A. Soule & David 
A. Armstrong II, Protesting While Black? The Differential Policing of American Activism, 
1960 to 1990, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 152, 168-69 (2011) (finding that predominantly African 
American protests had higher likelihood of police presence and police action). 
76 Davenport, Soule & Armstrong, supra note 75, at 169 (analogizing to “driving while 
black” phenomenon). 
77 Id. (theorizing that systematic racism causes state authorities to treat African American 
protesters more aggressively so as to maintain status quo). 
78 Id. at 166-68. 
79 Id. at 168. 
80 See CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER, POLICE POWER AND RACE RIOTS: URBAN UNREST IN PARIS 
AND NEW YORK 255 (2014). 
81 WOOD, supra note 13, at 41 (stating that specialized units used for predominantly black 
protests were also used for armed standoffs or the “War on Drugs”). 
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cannons, fire hoses, and special impact munitions against indigenous water 
protectors in the Dundon lawsuit evidences a militarized police response.82 In a 
prior article, I examined the police response to the pipeline protests and 
Ferguson protests and accounted for how, particularly in Ferguson, military 
police response was swift and unparalleled.83 People in Ferguson described 
feeling that police were invading the neighborhood.84 Further, the eventual 
discovery of communications between National Guard troops labeling Ferguson 
protesters a hate group85 demonstrates that the classification of minority activists 
as dangerous extended beyond the state police and local police. In contrast, the 
police response to a white nationalist protest in Charlottesville over the removal 
of a Confederate monument did not involve military vehicles, weapons, or 
tactics.86 Observers criticized law enforcement for failing to police the protests.87 
If police did not view the “Unite the Right” protesters as dangerous, they were 
wrong. A white nationalist ran his car into a crowd, killing one counterprotester 
and injuring several more.88 Another counterprotester was brutally beaten with 
a metal pole and then arrested by police.89 
However, law enforcement’s fear of protesters of color is reinforced by the 
federal government’s unwarranted historical and current preoccupation with 
racial justice movements. Hearkening back to the 1950s and ‘60s, the FBI’s 
targeting of African American activists is well documented in the agency’s own 
records. Stolen and subsequently leaked FBI headquarter documents revealed 
the persistent infiltration, surveillance, and harassment of groups termed “Black 
Extremists” from 1956 to 1971.90 According to the FBI operation 
 
82 Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
83 Pita Loor, supra note 62, at 26-29 (detailing use of SWAT teams, armored vehicles, and 
military tactics in response to protests). 
84 Id. at 27. 
85 Barbara Starr & Wesley Bruer, Missouri National Guard’s Term for Ferguson 
Protesters: ‘Enemy Forces,’ CNN (Apr. 17, 2015, 6:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04 
/17/politics/missouri-national-guard-ferguson-protesters/index.html [https://perma.cc/94H5-
AW7A]. 
86 Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08. 
87 Joe Heim et al., Charlottesville Protest Takes a Deadly Turn, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 
2017, at A14; see also HUNTON & WILLIAMS, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 
2017 PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 126-27 (2017), https://www.hunton 
ak.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/5V7C-ZQRQ]. 
88 Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08; Heim et al., supra note 87, at A14. 
89 Hansford, supra note 12, at 707-08; see also Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, 
Charlottesville: Black Protester Deandre Harris ‘Beaten with Metal Poles’ by White 
Supremacists, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2017, 4:48 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/world/americas/charlottesville-deandre-harris-black-protester-white-supremacists-
beat-metal-poles-neo-nazis-a7894916.html. 
90 See FBI Records: The Vault, COINTELPRO: Black Extremist, FBI, 
https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/cointel-pro-black-extremists [https://perma.cc/WTM9-
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COINTELPRO, black extremists included Martin Luther King Jr. and 
supporters as well as leaders of the Black Panther Party.91 The now-unclassified 
documents reveal multiple and serious FBI abuses, including that its agents 
attempted to convince King to commit suicide by threatening to reveal evidence 
of extramarital affairs gathered through illegal surveillance, and that they 
infiltrated the Black Panther Party and used information learned to conduct a 
raid of its leader Fred Hampton’s home, which resulted in his shooting and 
death.92 COINTELPRO provided a clear and scary picture of a federal law 
enforcement agency intent on watching and targeting movements seeking racial 
justice and using the rhetoric of radicalization to justify its efforts.93 After 
COINTELPRO was exposed, the FBI terminated the operation in 1971.94  
FBI focus on the activities of activists of color did not end with 
COINTELPRO; the FBI’s monitoring of movements by people of color is alive 
and well today. Data shows that from 2010 to 2019, the FBI has persistently 
surveilled racial justice activists.95 A leaked 2017 FBI intelligence report 
constructs, or perhaps revives, so-called “black extremists” as a terrorism 
threat—now termed “Black Identity Extremist.”96 The report states that these 
 
YJ3R] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter FBI Records: The Vault]; see also Allan M. 
Jallon, A Break-In to End All Break-Ins, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at B13 (describing break-
in of FBI office revealing documents detailing surveillance of black activist groups). 
91 See BETTY MEDSGER, THE BURGLARY 342-48 (2014); Jallon, supra note 90, at B13; FBI 
Records: The Vault, supra note 90. 
92 Jallon, supra note 90, at B13 (describing illegal tape created and sent by FBI to King 
urging him to commit suicide); see also MEDSGER, supra note 91, at 342-48 (stating that FBI 
claimed credit for murdering Hampton in leaked internal documents); Ursula Wolfe-Rocca, 
COINTELPRO: Teaching the FBI’s War on the Black Freedom Movement, RETHINKING 
SCHOOLS, https://www.rethinkingschools.org/articles/cointelpro-teaching-the-fbi-s-war-on-
the-black-freedom-movement [https://perma.cc/MJ9J-UGVD] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) 
(discussing FBI’s involvement in death of Black Panther Leader Fred Hampton). 
93 Bryan Schatz, A Former FBI Whistleblower Explains Why the Federal Government Is 
Failing on Domestic Terrorism—and How to Fix It, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/a-former-fbi-whistleblower-explains-why-
the-federal-government-is-failing-on-domestic-terrorism-and-how-to-fix-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/K7Q7-Q9X3] (interviewing former FBI agent on his duties to infiltrate 
groups deemed to be dangerous by FBI). 
94 Jallon, supra note 90, at B13 (discussing leak of FBI documents as end of 
COINTELPRO). 
95 CHIP GIBBONS, DEFENDING RIGHTS & DISSENTS, STILL SPYING ON DISSENT: THE 
ENDURING PROBLEM OF FBI FIRST AMENDMENT ABUSE 6-8 (2019), https://rightsand 
dissent.org/fbi-spying/ [https://perma.cc/BU8Z-6WE7] (detailing FBI’s monitoring activity 
of civil rights groups, such as By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”)). 
96 COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FBI, (U//FOUO) BLACK IDENTITY EXTREMISTS LIKELY 
MOTIVATED TO TARGET LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 2-4 (2017) [hereinafter FBI 
COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT], https://privacysos.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FBI-
BlackIdentityExtremists.pdf [https://perma.cc/678E-G8EC] (reporting incidents of violence 
against police officers as reason to watch “Black Identity Extremists” more closely); see also 
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Black Identity Extremists are a threat to law enforcement because their mission 
is to avenge the deaths of victims of police violence by killing officers.97 The 
FBI’s conclusion that this brand of terrorists exists is unfounded, dangerous, and 
paranoid, with former federal agents asserting that the label simply stands for 
“black people who scare [the FBI]”98 and that the classification simply allows 
government surveillance of “basically anyone who is black and politically 
active.”99 It conflates groups that protest racial injustice in various forms and 
that predominantly have African Americans as members into one single 
classification with a frightening goal. The FBI report lists six unconnected 
instances of planned or executed civilian violence against police from 2014 to 
2016 as proof of a manufactured sinister goal of various predominantly African 
American groups.100 This is despite the fact that these assailants are best 
described as lone actors.101 In a hearing before Congress in July 2019, the FBI 
Director asserted that the agency was no longer investigating Black Identity 
Extremists.102 However, additional documents that were leaked later suggest that 
while the label may have changed, the investigative protocol remained and 
included the Iron Fist Program with the goal of “proactively address[ing] this 
priority domestic terrorism target by focusing FBI operations via enhanced 
 
Khaled A. Beydoun & Justin Hansford, Opinion, The F.B.I.’s Dangerous Crackdown on 
‘Black Identity Extremists,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/11/15/opinion/black-identity-extremism-fbi-trump.html (analyzing history of 
COINTELPRO in connection with FBI decision to create label of “Black Identity 
Extremists”); Miriam Zoila Pérez, What Does the FBI’s New ‘Black Identity Extremist’ Label 
Really Mean to Black Organizing, COLORLINES (Oct. 25, 2017, 12:26 PM), 
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/what-does-fbis-new-black-identity-extremist-label-
really-mean-black-organizing [https://perma.cc/9ALL-C72L] (comparing FBI’s “Black 
Identity Extremist” label to COINTELPRO operations in 1960s). 
97 FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 2 (“The FBI assesses it is very likely 
Black Identity Extremist (BIE) perceptions of police brutality against African Americans 
spurred an increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement and 
will very likely serve as justification for such violence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
98 Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 96. 
99 Kate Irby, Protesters Are Increasingly Being Labeled Domestic Terrorist Threats, 
Experts Worry, IMPACT2020 (Oct 27, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news 
/nation-world/national/article181358311.html [https://perma.cc/R66Y-KP5W]. 
100 FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 4-6; see also GIBBONS, supra note 
95, at 7-11 (detailing FBI’s sometimes violent responses to those labeled BIEs). 
101 See FBI COUNTERTERRORISM REPORT, supra note 96, at 4-6 (finding no connection 
between attackers and any racial justice groups); Beydoun & Hansford, supra note 96 (“[The 
FBI Report] links incidents of violence by a handful of individual citizens . . . to ‘B.I.E. 
ideology . . . .’”). 
102 Byron Tau, FBI Abandons Use of Term ‘Black Identity Extremism,’ WALL STREET J. 
(July 23, 2019, 10:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-abandons-use-of-terms-black-
identity-extremism-11563921355 (“We only investigate violence. We don’t investigate 
extremism. We don’t investigate ideology.”). 
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intelligence collection efforts.”103 The facts should lead the FBI to concentrate 
its intelligence efforts elsewhere. The data show that when police need 
protection, it is from white extremists—not activists of color. Between 2001 and 
2017, of the forty-five police officers tragically killed by domestic extremists, 
thirty-four were killed by right-wing white extremists.104 A 2009 Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) report noted the dangerous rise of this trend and 
warned of right-wing extremism.105 While this report was harshly criticized by 
conservative politicians and subsequently disavowed by then-DHS Secretary 
Janet Napolitano, its predictions have come to fruition in the form of multiple 
deadly attacks not only on police but also on civilians by white nationalists and 
so-called “sovereign citizens” who oppose any government authority.106  
African Americans are not the only minority targets of federal law 
enforcement surveillance. In 2018, the ACLU obtained government documents 
suggesting that police were being trained with counterterrorism strategies to 
police indigenous protests of the Keystone pipeline.107 The same documents link 
 
103 Patrick G. Eddington, Constitution Day 2019: The Hidden Domestic Surveillance 
Crisis, CATO INST. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary 
/constitution-day-2019-hidden-domestic-surveillance-crisis [https://perma.cc/6UJE-3TFV]; 
Ken Klippenstein, FBI’s Document: Iron Fist Focuses on ‘Black Identity Extremist’ 
Movement, POPULARRESISTANCE.ORG (Aug. 24, 2019), https://popularresistance.org/fbis-
document-iron-fist-focuses-on-black-identity-extremist-movement/ [https://perma.cc/3CLY-
NQA8]; see also Letter from MediaJustice to Elijah Cummings, Chairman, U.S. House 
Oversight & Reform Comm., Jerry Nadler, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Comm., & 
Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, U.S. House Homeland Sec. Comm. (Sept 17, 2019), 
https://mediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ProtectBlackDissent-Response-Letter-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9V-RP5Y] (citing leaked documents in urging House to take 
action against FBI’s ongoing use of BIE label under different term). 
104 J. Oliver Conroy, They Hate the US Government, and They’re Multiplying: The 
Terrifying Rise of ‘Sovereign Citizens,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/sovereign-citizens-rightwing-terrorism-
hate-us-government [https://perma.cc/3MH2-97WQ]. 
105 OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IA-0257-09, 
(U//FOUO) RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING 
RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 1, 3, 8 (2009), https://fas.org/irp 
/eprint/rightwing.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4BT-9TK4]. 
106 Conroy, supra note 104. 
107 Will Parrish & Sam Levin, ‘Treating Protest as Terrorism’: US Plans Crackdown on 
Keystone XL Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.the 
guardian.com/environment/2018/sep/20/keystone-pipeline-protest-activism-crackdown-
standing-rock [https://perma.cc/BDJ5-5G97] (referencing training on mass-arrest protocol, 
riot-control formations, and crowd-control procedures); see also Sam Levin, Revealed: FBI 
Terrorism Taskforce Investigating Standing Rock Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017, 
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/10/standing-rock-fbi- 
investigation-dakota-access [https://perma.cc/Z7J6-LWXN] (detailing similar techniques 
used against Standing Rock activists). 
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DAPL indigenous water protectors to “environmental rights extremists.”108 As 
a matter of fact, an FBI antiterrorism task force worked with police to investigate 
opponents of the DAPL.109 Notably, in 2004 and 2005, the FBI considered 
environmental extremists the number one “domestic terrorism threat” despite 
the fact that there were no deaths associated with environmentalist actors.110 Just 
like the “black extremist” label, that of “environmental extremist” justifies 
government surveillance, government interference, and ultimately government 
violence to suppress protest activity of indigenous activists.111 Within the last 
decade, the FBI has engaged in persistent investigation of environmentalists, just 
as it has of racial justice activists.112 Either coincidentally or by design, this 
results in the targeting of indigenous activists whose interests intersect with 
environmental justice. During this time of intense FBI focus on black and 
environmental activists, the FBI has dropped the category of white supremacist 
violence as a basis for investigation, making it increasingly difficult to assess 
the threat of white supremacy and the extent of government efforts to investigate 
it.113  
Sadly, like law enforcement, white civilians have also historically viewed 
activists of color negatively—and still currently do. In the ‘60s, whites were 
likely to view civil rights protests as violent and harmful, while African 
Americans saw them as peaceful and productive.114 In 1966, 85% of whites 
polled thought that demonstrations by African Americans hurt the movement for 
civil rights, while a 1969 survey found that 70% of Blacks believed the 
 
108 See OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FIELD 
ANALYSIS REPORT: (U//FOUO) TTPS USED IN RECENT US PIPELINE ATTACKS BY SUSPECTED 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS 2 (2017); see also Alleen Brown, The Green Scare: 
How a Movement That Never Killed Anyone Became the FBI’s No. 1 Domestic Terrorism 
Threat, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 23, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/23 
/ecoterrorism-fbi-animal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/3YAH-VA5W] (detailing Homeland 
Security’s shift to focusing on environmental rights activists as potential terrorist threats). 
109 Levin, supra note 107 (reciting accounts of three individuals approached by FBI due to 
their connection with Standing Rock water protector movement). 
110 Irby, supra note 99. 
111 See id. (finding that such surveillance could lead to asset seizure without a hearing); 
see also Parrish & Levin, supra note 107 (noting Keystone Pipeline activists’ preparation for 
police violence during peaceful protest). 
112 GIBBONS, supra note 95, at 6-12 (analyzing FBI activity in connection with racial 
justice protests and environmental protests). 
113 Sandra Fulton, Opinion, FBI Must Come Clean on Targeting Racial-Justice Activists 
Before Sweeping Surveillance Powers Are Renewed, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:30 PM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/461822-fbi-must-come-clean-on-
targeting-racial-justice-activists [https://perma.cc/RN34-JSRE] (“[T]he bureau has dropped 
white-supremacist violence as a category at a time when hate crimes targeting communities 
of color are on the rise.”). 
114 Mora A. Reinka & Colin Wayne Leach, Race and Reaction: Divergent Views of Police 
Violence and Protest Against, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 768, 774 (2017). 
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demonstrations helped.115 Despite the passage of time and at least theoretical 
progress in racial relations, views on protests still differ by racial lines. 
Statistically, whites’ views of protests vary based on the purported race of the 
protesters. Thus, 67% of whites see protests as useful in achieving social change, 
unless protesters are characterized as black, in which case the number drops to 
45%.116 Whites are also more likely to justify violence perpetrated by police 
during protests. Only 33% of whites believed police violence in the Ferguson 
protests was unjustified, while 65% of African Americans found it unjustified.117 
Yet whites are less forgiving of violence by protesters in predominantly black 
protests. For example, 68% of whites thought activists who acted aggressively 
during protests of the police killing of Freddie Gray were “opportunistic 
criminals,” while 55% of African Americans saw violent acts by protesters as 
caused by “legitimate outrage.”118 
III. PROTEST CASES AS A SOURCE OF INQUIRY FOR 
CRITICAL RACE THEORISTS 
Knowing that protests are no different than regular street encounters in that 
people of color are more likely to experience police violence, the doctrinal 
impediments that aggregate to facilitate police abuse of protesters should 
concern critical race theorists. The Fourth Amendment sets particular 
impediments in the emblematic protest scenario, where police use force to 
disperse instead of detain activists. As a threshold matter, courts may find that 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply where police were using force not to 
arrest but to disperse activists. This ends the possibility of any Fourth 
Amendment redress.119 Even if a court finds that the Fourth Amendment does 
apply, the court may utilize a collective lens in mass protests and evaluate the 
constitutionality of an officer’s conduct in light of the conduct of the crowd 
instead of the conduct of the individual plaintiff. This approach is contrary to 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and dilutes any protection the Fourth 
 
115 Elahe Izadi, Black Lives Matter and America’s Long History of Resisting Civil Rights 
Protesters, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Apr. 19, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/19/black-lives-matters-and-americas-long-history-of-
resisting-civil-rights-protesters/. 
116 Reinka & Leach, supra note 114, at 774. 
117 Id. (discussing 2014 Pew poll that highlighted this difference in opinion). 
118 Id. (citation omitted). 
119 When the Court finds that the Fourth Amendment does not apply, it often finds that 
there was no due process violation either because that requires the plaintiff to meet the high 
burden of showing that the police conduct “shocks the conscience.” See Chavez v. Martinez, 
538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (describing unconstitutional police conduct under due process 
clause as “egregious” or “conscience shocking”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis ex rel. 
Estate of Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (“To this end, for half a century now we have 
spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the 
conscience.”). 
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Amendment provides. Returning to the pipeline protests, the district court’s first 
ruling in Dundon v. Kirchmeier—denying the plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin police 
from using less-than-lethal weapons and water hoses to confront water 
protectors120—demonstrates how the Fourth Amendment can fail activists of 
color in dispersal cases. 
A. Due to Troubling Developments in Court Doctrine, the Fourth 
Amendment Arguably Does Not Apply in the Emblematic Protest Scenario 
Where Police Use Force to Disperse Protesters 
In his Fourth Amendment analysis of the excessive-force claim in Dundon, 
Chief Judge Daniel Hovland reasoned that the Fourth Amendment may not even 
apply because activists were never arrested or affirmatively detained by 
police.121 This argument was advanced by the defendants in their Motion to 
Dismiss, where they relied on Fourth Amendment precedent to argue that 
because the police did not intend to detain the water protectors, they were never 
seized and thus the Fourth Amendment could not even apply.122 This is because 
the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D.123 concluded that a person is 
seized either when being physically touched by police or when submitting to 
state authority.124  
The Supreme Court greatly limited Fourth Amendment protection when it 
defined a seizure narrowly in Hodari D. Hodari D. argued that the Fourth 
Amendment protected him when he saw police chasing him and knew that he 
was not free to leave.125 However, the majority—via Justice Scalia—engaged in 
a literal analysis stating that “[t]the word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of 
a laying on of hands or application of physical force.”126 Post-Hodari D., the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply unless a police officer physically touches the 
individual or the individual submits to a government show of authority.127 In his 
 
120 Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *20 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (“[T]he Court finds no reasonable 
juror could conclude the level of non-lethal force used by law enforcement officers during the 
chaos on November 20, 2016, at the Backwater Bridge was objectively unreasonable.”). 
121 Id. 
122 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Kyle Kirchmeier et al. Motion to 
Dismiss at 39, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406 (D.N.D. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 
3071655 [hereinafter Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss] (“The Supreme Court 
subsequently clarified the termination or restraint upon a person’s freedom of movement must 
be through ‘means intentionally applied’ to constitute a ‘seizure’—an unintentional act cannot 
result in a seizure.” (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007))). 
123 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
124 Id. at 627-28; see also Renée Paradis, Note, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a Bright-
Line Rule Governing Seizure in Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 316, 318 (2003). 
125 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28. 
126 Id. at 626. 
127 Id. 
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dissent, Justice Stevens—joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall—criticized this 
narrowing as inconsistent with the goal of deterring police misconduct because 
it determined whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the interaction based 
on how the civilian responded, not on how the police behaved.128 Unless the 
person gives into police force, there is no literal seizure. It does not matter if the 
show of force is unwarranted, violent, or unsupported by probable cause. The 
dissent focused on how this limiting of the seizure—and, therefore, of the 
application of the Fourth Amendment—ignores the “coercive and intimidating” 
effects of police conduct.129 Justice Stevens worried that “[i]t [was] too early to 
know the consequences of [Hodari D.’s] holding. If carried to its logical 
conclusion, it will encourage unlawful displays of force that will frighten 
countless innocent citizens into surrendering whatever privacy rights they may 
still have.”130 
Fast forwarding from Hodari D. to Dundon, Chief Judge Hovland reasoned 
that since there was no physical laying of hands (and no arrests), the water 
protectors were not seized and the Fourth Amendment did not apply at all to any 
of the police conduct.131 According to the judge, the water protectors could have 
just complied with police orders to disperse.132 This conclusion ignored the 
plaintiffs’ reports that some were “locked in by [tear] gas, and also blinded and 
gagging,” decked to the ground by the force of the water, and that about two 
hundred were physically injured.133 Moreover, as mentioned in prior discussion, 
the Graham Court defined a seizure as some sort of restraint on personal liberty 
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.134 Further and consistent with the Hodari D. dissent, 
doing away with Fourth Amendment concerns simply by concluding that there 
was no seizure completely discounts how the police behaved in the 
confrontation. This limiting of Fourth Amendment protection fails to deter 
police violence and militaristic responses to activists. In Dundon, this limitation 
allowed the district judge’s easy denial of the injunction, thereby permitting law 
enforcement to continue this manner of assault on water protectors, which 
included blasting them for hours with water cannons, tear gas, concussion and 
other grenades, rubber bullets, and bean bag projectiles.135 A more protective 
Fourth Amendment analysis would not necessitate a literal seizure but would 
 
128 Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule 
focus on the conduct of law enforcement officers and on discouraging improper behavior on 
their part, and not on the reaction of the citizen to the show of force.” (footnote omitted)). 
129 Id. at 645-46. 
130 Id. at 646-47. 
131 Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted); Dundon Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
134 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
135 See Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *3 (listing various responses of law enforcement to 
protests). 
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instead exalt the liberty rationale of the Fourth Amendment. As the dissent in 
Hodari D. stated, Terry expanded the ambit of Fourth Amendment seizures to 
interactions that did not amount to arrests—to “restraint[s] of an individual’s 
personal liberty ‘in some way.’”136 In Dundon, police intruded not only on the 
water protectors’ right to be left alone but importantly also on their right to 
protest, object to, and dissent from the construction of DAPL. Thus, the court 
should have exalted the water protectors’ liberty interests instead of discounting 
them because they had not been arrested or told that they could not leave.137 The 
proper balance may be that where the liberty interest involves First Amendment 
conduct, the court must more scrupulously examine the government’s 
intrusion.138 In other words, where law enforcement seeks to police or regulate 
expression—not criminal conduct—the Graham reasonableness test must be 
adapted to protect the expressive conduct. 
Other courts are divided regarding how the Fourth Amendment applies to 
dispersal cases.139 A court could just assume that the police conduct implicates 
the Fourth Amendment. This was the district judge’s approach in Lamb v. City 
of Decatur,140 where police used pepper spray against a group of protesters.141 
However, it is unclear from the opinion whether the defendants made the 
argument that there was no seizure. In Marbet v. City of Portland,142 the City 
and the police officers contended that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to 
their use of pepper spray and rubber bullets or to their act of physically moving 
activists who were protesting the Bush presidency.143 The factual narrative 
suggests that the plaintiffs were not arrested.144 The court disagreed with the 
defendants and had no problem finding that a seizure occurs when police use 
“physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately 
unsuccessful.”145 The Marbet judge found that the attempt to control the 
activists’ movement was determinative of the case’s outcome.146  
 
136 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
137 See Dundon, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (“Plaintiffs have neither alleged they were 
arrested or detained by law enforcement officials . . . nor alleged they were informed by law 
enforcement officers they were not free to leave and walk away.”). 
138 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (“Where the materials sought 
to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 
U.S. 476, 485 (1965))). 
139 See Paradis, supra note 124, at 334-41 (describing uncertainties that exist in Fourth 
Amendment case law regarding public protests and dispersal). 
140 947 F. Supp. 1261 (C.D. Ill. 1996). 
141 Id. at 1263. 
142 No. 1:02-cv-01448, 2003 WL 23540258 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2003). 
143 Id. at *10. 
144 Id. at *1. 
145 Id. at *10. 
146 Id. 
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This focus on the police conduct is useful when at least part of the objective 
is to deter police violence. In Quraishi v. St. Charles County,147 the district court 
again focused on the actions of law enforcement, ruling that journalists in the 
streets of Ferguson reporting on the police shooting of Michael Brown were 
seized when the police sprayed them with tear gas.148 The judge stated that 
“[f]iring tear gas, pepper spray, or other chemical agents at someone can 
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”149 In direct contrast, in the 
case of Ellsworth v. City of Lansing,150 the judge did not engage in any Fourth 
Amendment analysis when police teargassed protesters. In support of this 
conclusion, the judge cited County of Sacramento v. Lewis151 and stated 
parenthetically, without any further discussion, that “where no seizure occurs, 
[a] claim of excessive force is analyzed under the substantive due process 
standard, rather than [the] Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.”152 
Likewise, in a lawsuit surrounding a protest of the police involved in the killing 
of Eric Garner, the judge concluded that law enforcement’s use of long-range 
acoustic devices (“LRADs”) against activists did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.153 The judge stated that “[a]n officer’s request to leave an area, 
even with use of force, is not a seizure unless ‘accompanied by the use of 
sufficient force intentionally to restrain a person and gain control of his 
movements.’”154 
Also, another district court stated that, when assessing whether to evaluate the 
police conduct pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a court may differentiate 
between protesters depending on where each was situated and make judgments 
regarding who was able to escape the scene and who was essentially captured 
 
147 No. 4:16-cv-01320, 2019 WL 2423321 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 
19-2462 (8th Cir. July 12, 2019). 
148 Id. at *8-9. 
149 Id. at *9 (citation omitted). 
150 34 F. Supp. 2d 571 (W.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1340 (2000). 
151 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1986). 
152 Ellsworth, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 580-81 (concluding that police conduct did not shock 
conscience and therefore did not violate due process). 
153 Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d sub nom. 
Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018). 
154 Id. (quoting Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2015)). Interestingly, 
however, the Second Circuit subsequently held that even though the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply, the plaintiffs had asserted a sufficient substantive due process claim for excessive 
force. Maguire, 892 F.3d at 529 (“[W]e hold that purposefully using a LRAD in a manner 
capable of causing serious injury to move non-violent protesters to the sidewalks violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment under clearly established law.”). The Second Circuit based this 
conclusion on what the court perceived as a new articulation of due process excessive-force 
claims that essentially uses the same tests for excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See id. at 534-38. 
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by chemical agents.155 This type of plaintiff-by-plaintiff analysis is not helpful 
in terms of regulating police conduct or in terms of decreasing the likelihood of 
the aggressive use of chemical agents by law enforcement when responding to 
protesters. Again, this is because such analysis defines whether the Fourth 
Amendment offers protection based on how the police aggression affected the 
victims and not based on whether the conduct was wrongful and excessive in the 
first place.  
Thus, for some courts, the Supreme Court precedent defining seizure has 
arguably removed Fourth Amendment protections from the typical protest 
scenario, in which law enforcement use militaristic force and military grade 
weapons to disperse protesters.156 Section 1983, by its own language, is a tool to 
“redress” violations of individual’s constitutional rights by any person acting on 
behalf of the government.157 A literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
seizure language in the context of dispersal cases therefore violates the remedial 
purposes of the Act. The vehicle that the Court has determined will vindicate 
victims’ rights is arguably not available in a swath of protest cases.158  
B. Protesters as Unit  
Even when a court finds that the Fourth Amendment applies to the police 
conduct, the court may use a distorted lens to assess civilian behavior that unduly 
amplifies the threat protesters pose to officer and public safety. Because the 
Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis involves balancing to assess 
“reasonableness,” a miscalculation of protesters’ conduct leads to a 
miscalculation of the degree of police force that is reasonable.  
The question in excessive-force cases is theoretically a balancing between the 
conduct of the target and the response of police. The court engages in this 
 
155 Buck v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:04-cv-01000, 2007 WL 9734037, at *30-32 
(D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2007) (stating that seizure “depend[s] on a Plaintiff’s location” and whether 
“a reasonable person could have concluded that he or she was not free to leave the area or 
otherwise terminate the encounter,” while considering seizure by chemical agents and 
physical contact separately). 
156 See Pita Loor, supra note 62, at 26-27; see also Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-
00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *18 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th 
Cir.) (per curiam); WOOD, supra note 13, at 41-42. 
157 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
158 The Dundon defendants also reasoned that any Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim would be more challenging for plaintiffs because the requirement that conduct “shock 
the conscience” is a more burdensome standard than an “objective reasonableness” analysis. 
Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 51. Although the language of both 
the due process test and the Fourth Amendment test would suggest that this is a reasonable 
inference, there might not be an actual difference in terms of plaintiffs’ likelihood of success 
because both constitutional provisions require a showing of bad motive. See Brown, supra 
note 56, at 1274 (“Whether analyzing the use of force under the fourth amendment or the 
fourteenth, most courts find a constitutional violation only when the defendants have acted 
unreasonably and with improper motivation.”). 
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balancing by evaluating: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether there is an 
immediate threat, and (3) whether the target is resisting arrest or trying to flee.159 
As discussed in Part I, Graham’s permissive language about the “split-second 
decisions” police must make provides too much deference to aggression by law 
enforcement.160 This deference sets a low bar for police aggression because 
judges attribute mistakes in police judgments to “tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving” circumstances.161 In the protest scenario, courts further compound the 
assessment of the threat that police face by weighing the actions of the crowd of 
protesters in conjunction with the actions of the individual plaintiff-protesters. 
This is contrary to traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which inquires 
whether the government intrusion is reasonable in light of the individual’s 
actions—not the actions of those in proximity or even of his associates.162 Just 
like a police officer should not be able to arrest someone in proximity to a 
lawbreaker, the officer should not be able to use force against someone in 
proximity to a lawbreaker. After all, police are permitted to use force as justified 
by their official duties—not because they have some natural right to use force 
against the general public. If the court considers the actions of the crowd as a 
unit versus the actions of an individual plaintiff-protester, then the threat 
calculus is off balance and the court will justify what would otherwise be 
unconstitutional police violence.  
The Dundon defendants advocated for this mode of analysis before the district 
court. Even though there was no allegation that the Dundon plaintiffs were 
anything other than peaceful, the defendants argued that police force was 
reasonable because the plaintiffs were part of a unit that was behaving 
unlawfully. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants stated that the plaintiffs 
“were intermingled [with others who] were engaged in removing and attempting 
to remove government property from Law Enforcement’s barricade prior to 
force allegedly being applied to them. The only reasonable inference is [that] the 
unlawful conduct of the protesters . . . motivated Law Enforcement’s alleged use 
 
159 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Because ‘[t]he test of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application,’ . . . its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (first alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979))). 
160 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (arguing that such a permissive standard 
effectively immunizes large swath of aggressive police conduct). 
161 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
162 See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person. Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a 
person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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of force.”163 The defendants further cited Carr v. District of Columbia164 for the 
proposition that a “requirement that the officers verify that each and every 
member of a crowd engaged in a specific riotous act would be practically 
impossible in any situation involving a large riot.”165 Thus, the defendants 
argued that the use of force was reasonable to control the crowd or unit rather 
than to control the plaintiffs specifically.166 
The Dundon defendants’ reference to Carr is significant because the concept 
of unit probable cause was initially adopted by the court in that case.167 In that 
case, the D.C. District Court had ruled that the plaintiff protesters’ arrests 
violated the Fourth Amendment because the police could not establish that each 
of the people they arrested was engaged in the crime of rioting.168 The D.C. 
Circuit reversed, holding that the police need only show a “reasonable belief that 
the entire crowd is acting as a unit and therefore all members of the crowd 
violated the law.”169 The D.C. Circuit accepted the risk that an innocent protester 
could be swept up in the arrest highlighting that the question was one of probable 
cause, not final conviction.170 However, this language minimizes how far of a 
departure this type of group analysis is from the probable cause requirement of 
individualized suspicion. In the protest scenario, it also ignores how this group 
analysis harms activists’ right to express dissent—thus undervaluing protest 
activity. This concept of unit probable cause espouses guilt by association and 
thus dilutes the Fourth Amendment beyond recognition. The rights of activists 
who participate in mass protests are in particular danger in jurisdictions that 
adopt this group analysis. 
Returning to Dundon, the district judge referenced the “chaotic scenario”171 
and the “sizeable minority of protesters . . . [whom he] categorized as a group of 
unlawful and violent agitators” when he denied the injunction.172 The judge 
ruled that if the Fourth Amendment applied, no reasonable juror could find that 
 
163 Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 2. 
164 587 F.3d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
165 Dundon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 27 (quoting Bernini v. City 
of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
166 Id. at 28-32; id. at 31 (“Regardless, Bernini establishes the use of non-lethal munitions 
upon an unruly crowd, which officers reasonably believe is acting as a unit, to prevent the 
crowds unlawful access to property and to restore order, is objectively reasonable as a matter 
of law.”). 
167 Id. at 27-28 (citing Bernini, 665 F.3d at 1003). 
168 Carr, 587 F.3d at 405-06. 
169 Id. at 408. 
170 Id. (“Probable cause only requires a reasonable belief of guilt, not a certitude.” (citing 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))). 
171 Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-00406, 2017 WL 5894552, at *19 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 
2017), aff’d mem., 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir.) (per curiam). 
172 Id. at *8. 
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the force was unreasonable.173 The judge focused on the overall scene and 
volatility of the crowd—instead of the specific acts of the plaintiffs—suggesting 
that he was persuaded by the defendants’ reference to Carr and to a group/unit 
analysis.  
Since Carr was decided in 2009, various jurisdictions have progressively 
embraced this Fourth Amendment unit analysis in protest cases. The Dundon 
defendants were well situated because the Eighth Circuit had already adopted 
group probable cause in Bernini v. City of St. Paul.174 In Bernini, the court found 
that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when arresting a large group 
of protesters at the Republican National Convention, even though the officers 
were unable to articulate probable cause for each person arrested. Citing Carr, 
the court determined that  
[w]hat is reasonable in the context of a potential large-scale urban riot may 
be different from what is reasonable in the relative calm of a tavern with a 
dozen patrons. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officers 
have grounds to believe all arrested persons were a part of the unit observed 
violating the law.”175  
In another Eighth Circuit case, the court applied group probable cause to 
Ferguson protesters.176 The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ arrests for failure 
to disperse were reasonable because they “chose not to disassociate” themselves 
from the group throwing debris at police and instead continued to walk while 
“in the vicinity of a violent crowd” toward the line of police shooting rubber 
bullets at them.177 Thus, the proximity of the plaintiffs to an unlawful crowd 
justified the police’s violent conduct.  
As an example of the growing acceptance of this looser, group probable cause 
standard for protests, courts within the Second Circuit—courts that previously 
rejected group probable cause—are increasingly embracing it for mass protests. 
In a pre-Carr decision, the Second Circuit ruled in Papineau v. Parmley178 that 
police violated the Fourth Amendment when they beat and violently arrested 
indigenous protesters indiscriminately.179 Because the police admitted that they 
could not identify whether any of the plaintiffs were actually blocking the 
roadway—which was necessary for a disorderly conduct arrest—the court ruled 
 
173 Id. at *19. 
174 665 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (considering mass arrests of 
approximately one hundred protesters surrounding Republican National Convention). 
175 Id. at 1003 (quoting Carr, 587 F.3d at 407). 
176 White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 2017) (considering claims by six sets 
of plaintiffs arrested during protest). 
177 Id. at 1075-79. 
178 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006). 
179 Id. at 53 (describing violent police action including “beating [protesters] with their riot 
batons, dragging them by their hair and kicking them,” choking a praying man, manhandling 
both an eleven-year-old girl and an elderly medicine woman, and “even toss[ing] an infant in 
a double leg cast from his stroller”). 
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that the police could not have reasonably believed that the mass arrest was 
justified because a few protesters had violated the law.180 The court further 
articulated how a rule that would permit the unlawful actions of some to be 
attributed to the whole group would affect the First Amendment in that “we see 
little that would prevent the police from ending a demonstration without notice 
for the slightest transgression by a single protester.”181  
Post-Carr, in Dinler v. City of New York,182 the defendants cited group 
probable cause pursuant to Carr, arguing that police could arrest the entire group 
“where it reasonably appears to the police that a large group is engaging in 
unlawful conduct.”183 A judge in New York’s Southern District, citing the 
principle of individualized probable cause espoused in Ybarra v. Illinois,184 
rejected the defendants’ arguments that they possessed probable cause to arrest 
Republican National Convention protesters for obstruction of traffic and defying 
a police order to disperse.185 However, the judge did not specifically reject 
Carr’s reasoning, stating that Carr did not really promulgate a new probable 
cause standard but instead “stand[s] for the unremarkable proposition that, 
where a group of individuals is acting in concert such that a reasonable officer 
could conclude that every member of the group violated the law, that officer 
would be justified in arresting every member of the group.”186 Calling the Carr 
proposition “unremarkable” in the realm of probable cause is a 
mischaracterization because it deviates from individualized suspicion.  
The same year and in the same district, in Garcia v. Bloomberg,187 another 
judge rejected the defendants’ arguments to treat seven hundred Occupy Wall 
Street marchers as a group because even if not all protesters heard the police 
warnings to avoid the street, some did, and law enforcement could then arrest all 
of them for disorderly conduct pursuant to Carr.188 The district judge 
distinguished Carr by differentiating between violent rioters and peaceful 
protesters.189 However, the Second Circuit sitting en banc reversed without 
mentioning Carr, instead highlighting the “confused and boisterous situation 
confronting the officers” and noting that some protesters were able to hear the 
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181 Id. at 57. 
182 No. 1:04-cv-07921, 2012 WL 4513352 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012). 
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Summary Judgment to Dismiss the False Arrest Claims of Plaintiffs Arrested on East 16th 
Street at 9, Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352 (No. 1:04-cv-07921)). 
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185 Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352, at *5. 
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Cir. 2013), rev’d en banc, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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police warning yet made no attempts to disperse.190 This was sufficient for the 
Second Circuit to conclude that there was probable cause to arrest all protesters 
for disorderly conduct.191 While the Second Circuit did not allude to group 
probable cause in Garcia, the ruling that failure of some protesters to heed police 
orders was sufficient to result in the arrest of seven hundred individuals 
demonstrates that the court allowed the actions of some activists to be attributed 
to the entire group. 
This looser probable cause standard means that police can easily justify the 
indiscriminate use of violent tactics and less-than-lethal weapons when they 
assert that violent protesters were in the vicinity. This standard substantially 
deviates from and is inconsistent with traditional individualized determinations 
of suspicion.  
CONCLUSION 
Police officers’ targeting of protesters of color is unlikely to end considering 
that it dates back to the beginning of the American republic. Whether quelling 
slave rebellions,192 cracking down on a Mexican American rally against Chicano 
casualties in the Vietnam War,193 or suppressing civil rights marchers in 
Selma,194 government authorities have consistently responded brutally to dissent 
from people of color. When nonwhite activists challenge the status quo, law 
enforcement reacts with military-grade force to quash protests. Protesters of 
color have few allies because the white majority—which benefits from the status 
quo—sees these protest movements as generally corrosive to society and to 
progress.195 The courts are not allies either. Instead, harmful Fourth Amendment 
doctrines coalesce to facilitate police abuse of activists of color.  
This Essay demonstrates how the Fourth Amendment fails to provide 
protection in the emblematic protest scenario, in which law enforcement 
employs brutal and often militaristic force to disperse protesters. 
Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment also fails its own roots, deviating from 
the principle of individualized suspicion in favor of group suspicion. This 
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analysis suggests that courts should recalibrate their treatment of police-
excessive-force claims in mass protest cases in order to reign in law enforcement 
abuse and to be more protective of activists’ rights to dissent. An alternative 
analysis should elevate protest rights and apply a more rigorous Fourth 
Amendment review when the police seek to control expressive conduct. 
